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An International Remedy for Depreciated Currencies 
By Alois Rašìn* 
 
When the terms of the Armistice and of the Peace were still under discussion I 
recommended the making of an arrangement whereby by the Entente could exercise 
control over the German Imperial Bank and the Austro-Hungarian Bank so as to put an 
end to the issue of banknotes uncovered by commercial security. I considered such a 
measure essential for preventing the defeated states taking the opportunity of increasing 
the currency inflation and steering for bankruptcy by artificial methods. The precaution, 
however, was not incorporated into either the terms of the armistice or into those of peace.  
In the exercise of my functions as Minister of Finance I did all I could to make the 
Austro-Hungarian Bank restrict the issue of unbacked notes, I refused recognition to the 
State Commissioner attached to the Bank and succeeded in compelling the Bank to admit 
Commissioners representing the Succession States. Our own Commissioner received 
strict injunctions to allow no uncovered banknotes to be printed. The Lamasch 
Government at Vienna desired to issue 2 milliard crowns worth of uncovered notes for 
the states which had previously formed part of Austro-Hungary. I resisted this proposal 
and pointed out that for such purpose the consent of all the Succession states was 
necessary. In spite of our protests the Bank issued those two milliards. I replied by taking 
over the control of all the branches of the Bank in Czechoslovakia. I forbade the advance 
of money on the War Loans, the Austro-Hungarian Bank having begun to make advances 
up to 75% of the nominal value of the 5 ‡ % War Loans at 5%: in other words to convert 
War Loans into currency and to advance 75 % of the face value at a time when the value 
of these loans had fallen to 60%, so that the person purchasing the new loan could 
mortgage 75 % and make a gain of 15 % of the nominal value.  
In face of protests the Bank continued to issue notes for Austrian and Hungary with the 
obvious result that as our currencies were identical these banknotes came over to us and 
increased. the inflation here. The Bank was not even content with merely printing 
existing values. It proceeded to introduce banknotes for 10.000 crowns and for 25 and 
200 crowns which were printed only on one side So as to be produced with the greater 
rapidity. I refused recognition of these banknotes for, the territory of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, and later when the banknotes wore stamped I declined to admit them to 
stamping.  
I took over the control of the branches of the Austro-Hungarian Bank on Czechoslovak 
territory and by an enactment of the 10th April 19l9 the State was empowered to take 
over the stamped notes and replace them by Czechoslovak notes. The amount of these 
Czechoslovak notes was strictly limited: anything issued over and above the limit being 
required to be covered by commercial security or gold or silver.  
Meanwhile a Bank of Issue was created which is prohibited by law from lending to the 
State and which is administered by a committee absolutely independent of the State. The 
amount of commercially uncovered banknotes is being reduced by a Tax on Wealth, paid 
directly to the Bank Office/the State Bank of Issue/ which at once destroys an equivalent 
amount in banknotes. Furthermore at the time the banknotes were stamped the sum of 
5160 million crowns in notes was withheld as a compulsory loan. These have not been 
returned to circulation, and the loan is being paid off by the Wealth Tax. According to the 
Bank Office Statement of 30th September last the amount has already been reduced to 
2256 millions.  
I am tracing thus the history of efforts made Czechoslovakia to maintain the standard of 
the currency in order to show that there is a substantial reason why the Czechoslovak 
crown compares so favourably with the depreciated currencies in the surrounding 
countries.  
In 2 ‡ years Czechoslovakia has withdrawn from circulation, 568 million crowns of 
unbacked notes, and that by voluntary payments of the Wealth Tax. As this tax has only 
just begun to be assessed the reduction of the whole amount of unbacked banknotes will 
proceed very rapidly. The amount per head of population of these notes in 
Czechoslovakia is only 851 crowns, whereas in Poland the figure is 6900 marks, in 
Austria 11.666 crowns, in Germany l6l3 marks, in Hungary 2,800 crowns. There is thus 
in Czechoslovakia, an industrial country, the smallest inflation of all and it is difficult to 
understand why the value of the Czechoslovak crown in the international market has 
fallen so low. The cause of the present state of affairs can only be attributed to the 
systematic multiplication of paper money by the surrounding states and the fear–which is 
quite unfounded–that Czechoslovakia too will be drawn into this maelstrom of paper 
currencies.  
To come to an international solution of the currency problem, it seems to me that the 
disease cannot be cured at a stroke but only by degrees. It springs from the fact that not 
enough is produced to meet the demands of a higher standard of life especially on the part 
of the broad masses of the people. We have been impoverished by the War, but so far the 
general public has failed to grasp what is the one and only possible solution of the post-
war crisis, namely, that more work must be done than before the War and that much more 
economy must be exercised in order that the means of production may be brought up to a 
proper standard.  
It is necessary, however, to do away with the disorder existing in matters international 
and to introduce good order. We need an international Union of States which would 
pledge themselves to issue no banknotes for the purpose of covering state expenditure, 
which would contrive some plan of restricting inflation, of regulating the existing 
national debts in paper monies which would subordinate themselves to the control of the 
international Union in respect of the obligations which they undertook on entering the 
Union, that is the obligation to support each other by credits and by protecting their 
currencies against international speculation and against an unjust diffusion of distrust. 
Possibly such a Union could undertake the calling together of its members to supervise 
budgets, to determine upon principles of economy for the individual budgets and perhaps 
also to come to agreement on measures and laws to be adopted with a view to promoting 
production to creating a uniformity in social legislation and similar matters.  
All this, however, would be the second stage. The first essential is to get rid of the 
disorder arising from the paper circulation and which stands in the way of every attempt 
at a betterment of economic conditions.  
The countries with undepretiated currencies need this just as much as those with 
depretiated currencies. The issue of paper currency in Germany to cover the deficit in the 
State finances and to avoid the imposition of taxes and increase in the railway tariffs has 
had the effect of making German goods cheaper and enabling them to compete with 
English manufactures: the fall of the mark has been the protection against the import of 
English goods into Germany and an expert premium on goods exported from Germany. 
The German dumping system was only made possible by the inordinate printing of 
banknotes for the State.  
We in Czechoslovakia have had to suffer doubly from this: our raw materials /cotton, 
wool, hides/ we have had to import from countries with high-value currency, while we 
export our products to countries with currencies inferior to our own, /Hungary, 
Yougoslavia [sic], Roumania, Poland/.  
In some countries the issuing of uncovered notes has gone on to such an extent that 
without forcible measures, without some kind of liquidation the situation perhaps cannot 
be remedied. At all events to leave things to go on as they are would ultimately result in a 
total repudiation of paper money end in an extraordinary social convulsion.  
But in countries where such issuing of banknotes had not taken place, where on the 
contrary the financial burdens arising from, the War have been taken over, or in the 
countries where only moderate use has been made of the printing press, the Union 
suggested above could achieve very considerable results by the exercise of its control, by 
standing as a sort of surety for the manner in which the banks of issue are conducted and 
being responsible for the correctness of their balance sheets–for in the case of paper 
currencies, confidence is a great factor in the determination of rates of exchange. In 
proportion to prices prevailing in Czechoslovakia the Czechoslovak crown has a 
purchasing power in this country of at least 12 Swiss centimes, but the rate of exchange 
as fixed at Zurich is only 6 centimes; for nobody is sufficiently well acquainted with our 
new State, while the chaos of inflation existing in all the countries surrounding us tends 
to increase the fears with regard to our money. If, however, the Union investigated the 
home purchasing power of the currency and provided the means of keeping the 
international rate of exchange at the level of this purchasing power at home, we should 
arrive at a stabilization of currencies and at a determination of their relative values. And 
for the moment that is all we need.  
Each state by its own industry, economy and promoting of its national wealth would, by 
its own efforts, have to concern itself with the improvement of this purchasing power and 
with the raising of its rate of exchange to the same level. This is all the help that each 
nation needs from the stronger to prevent its being driven by the fluctuations of the 
exchanges into a mania for speculation, to enable it to calculate and not gamble, to enable 
it to believe that by hard and earnest work it will issue from the post-War crisis and arrive 
at prosperity, a genuine prosperity–and not a paper one.  
 
*Brief Biography of Alois Rašìn 
By T. Mills Kelly 
Born: 1867 
Died:1923 
Alois Rašin was the man most responsible for the Czechoslovak economy's successful 
emergence from the chaos of the collapsing Habsburg state. Before the war Rašin had 
been a prominent member of the Young Czech party led by Karel Kramar (after 1918 the 
National Democrats), serving in the imperial Reichsrat. During the war he was tried for 
treason along with Kramar and sentenced to death. Pardoned by Emperor Karl in 1917, 
he resumed his political activities upon his release from prison and was a leading member 
in the National Committee in Prague. Serving as Minister of Finance in the first 
Czechoslovak government and again in 1922, he pursued a rigorous policy that 
demanded sacrifice from individual citizens in the form of wealth taxes and the 
expectation that each citizen would work hard at low pay until such time as the economy 
was on a firm footing. Rašin paid the ultimate price for the unpopularity of his stringent 
fiscal policies when he was assassinated by a member of the Communist party in 1923.  
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